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Abstract 
1n Part 1， previous results on the theory of a priori measure are recti五ed，renovated and 
rearranged for a systematic course of lectures. Herewith， itis specially emphasized that a euclidian 
space may be thought as a model of ph巴nomenal五eldof physical events， independently of any 
metamathematical view on set theories. Besides， empiricism is thought to be ess巴ntialto our 
inferences. 1n Part I， logical investigations are shown， standing on the empiricist view， and the 
principle of trans-induction is brought forward in a renovated form. 
Introduction 
Sets in a euclidian space may be taken up as the first and fundamental objects 
in empiricism. But the notion of a single point wiU then be nonsensical if shown 
independently of the space in which it dwells， because a‘point' must lose its 
actual sight of existence if it accompanies nothing to build its spatial neighborhood 
arround it. In this view， the ‘space' may appear to be antecedent to a 'point'. 
On the other handラ theeuclidian space has been used as a model of the phe-
nomenal field of physical events， directly connected to our intuition， from the 
ancient days of Euclidus. In五ne，geometrical forms in this space comprehend 
many meanings， historically accumulated through experiments and investigations， 
which had been made before the set theory was started. These being so， the set 
theory shall restrain itself from spoiling any aspect of the above-mentioned his-
torical knowledges， which shall positively be qualified as the guides for correction 
over al of the theories connected to the euclidian space. Standing on this view 
the theory of a priori measure 均 wasconstructed. While some amount of works 
on the measure伝 weremade by the present author， some occasional changes or 
alternations thereof could not be helped. In Part 1， an ultimate coures of lectures 
is tried to settle some problems on m and to give some preliminary foundations 
for forthcoming studies of set functions. 
Among the recent works on foundations of mathematics， the inf1uence of 
symbolic logic may be marked as a conspicuous vogue. However， ifsymbolic 
logic be simply applied with empiricism， itis feared that the universe of objects 
*紀国谷芳雄
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may then be obscured by some metamathematical mist of abstraction. 1n e丘ect，
some investigation on the relation of ‘implication' to 'logical range' have discovered 
a possible discrepancy between concret疋 objectificationand abstract one. Moreover， 
empiricism prohibits the use of transfinite ordinals of higher class than the 3rd， 
so that the trans五niteinduction cannot be applied here. Besidesラ infact， the 
transfinite treatment beyond the 3rd class， isessentially discordant with the a priori 
measure in a euclidian space. The logical investigations on the theory of a priori 
m白 surein empiricism are shown in outline in Part 11. 
1. Sets and Measures in a Euc1idian Space 
1. A Priori Measure 
Length， area and volume may be cited as geometric events which from ancient 
times have been evident to human intuition. These events are namely geometric 
五gures，and are equally called sets of points by the recent terminology. They are 
thereby defined as the measures of a set in one， two and three dimensions 
respectively. We specially call it a priori m印刷rein the meaning that it is 
essential to human intuition. The a priori measure of a set M is written as inM 
(or in(M)). inM is then the numerical value which indicates the largeness of the 
space occupied by the set M. 1n this case， the set M is considered to be 
contained in a euclidian space. However， we extend and generalize the space 
a litle far， and by E we mean a general五nitedimensional euclidian space. 
1n case of dimension 1， we have 
in [0，α]=α 
[0フ a]being the closed interval {x: 0 ~ xζα} . As a increases， the part occupied 
by [0， a]increases. This occupation is thought to be realized by points contained 
in [0， a]. Since a point， however， was de五nedas an interval which has only its 
position in the space and no largeness to be counted， ithas been thought di伍cult
to construct the measure of a set by means of the points contained in it. When 
we let a point x correspond to the point Ax (，.¥>0)， we may naturally suppose that 
the size of a point Ax should be given by multiplication of the size of the point 
x byんsothat we may have the relation 
in [0， Aa] = ，.('in [0，α] . 
Thus， the situation that points make up the occupation of a set in a space E， 
must induce a spatial relation of each point to the space E， which admits a quan-
titative character toward a point. By this reason we associate a point P with an 
infinitesimal piece of space (P) supposed to be occupied by P， and call (P) the 
(point) occupation of P in respect to the a priori measure ゑItwi1l then be 
considerable that e. g. 
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(何))= (X-O，針。)， [X， X+O)， [X-~ 0， X寸0)etc 
Since a set is defined as an aggregate of points， the number of the points 
contained in it may naturally be abstracted. Namely， we de五nemM inthe form 
勿M=仰 (M) (1. 1) 
where μ=勿((P))(PεM) 
and n (M) is called the invelぜonnumber of M. 
In the above case， the size of a point P in E is considered to be everywhere 
equal; the measure 伝 isthen called a normal (a priori) measure. When 
μp-茄(P)
is not everywhere equal， m， is said to be abnormal. The integral construction of 
mノM is given by 
mM=0μp (1. 2) 
PEJJf 
which may coincide with the classical formula 
伝M=SdP 
μP is called the (point) dimension (or the m，-dimension) of P. The sum of al the 
point occupations of A is called the (total) occupation of A， which will give 
a concrete concept， equivalent to that of a set， to comprehend the spatial con同
日tructionof the integration (1. 2). 
In case of n dimensions， a point P being represented by the cartesian coor幽
dinate (xJ， ・1 ふよ thepoint dimension of P is given in the form 
μP-μ必1・ μXn'
where ん正 isregarded as the projection of μP on the k-th axis. Thenラ μP shall 
naturally correspond to the integral element 
dX1・ dXn
in the classical theory of integral. 
The notion of the size of a point may give a convenient medium of illustra聞
tion. For instance， in the plane geometry， ifthe point P，λis representecl by the 
polar coordinate (ρk> (h) (ん=1， 2)， we have 
μpjμP2 = ρ1μρ1μ0，1ρ2 f1P2μ02=ρdρ2ラ
if 件 and向 aregiven as normal dimensions. Then， the ratio of the sizes of P1 
ancl P2 shall be regarded as equal to Pl/ρ2・
In case of an abnormal (a priori) measure z札 theinversion number H (M) of 
a set M cannot be given by (1. 1). In this case， the following formulation may 
give a help. If 
A(P) = μp/μQ 
(149) 
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Q being a五xedpointヲ weshall have 
}:= inMjμQu(M) 
A being the mean value of ?(P) for PEM. 
2. Re日ilience
The representative convention such that 
1 = 0.99・・・ラ 0.23 = 0.2299・・etc.
may be said very convenient in point that any real number can， through this 
modi五cation，be uniquely expressed; stil， the statement that the limit of the values 
0.9， 0圃99，・
is equal to 1， may not always be cosidered as strictly appropriate. If exactly， it
must be that 
0.99・・ = 1-0. 
1n effect， ifa univoque function f(x) is discontinuous on the left hand of a point 
x， then it must be that 
f(x)手f(x-O). 
1t may generally be admitted that， in the space of real numbers， any point x 
has no point just prior or just posterior to it. This situation may be considered 
coincident with the fact that two intervals of di旺erentlength can be set in onか
one correspondence of points. However， ifthese intervals be restricted to the 
same normal measure， one-one corresponcence must only mean an equal measure 
of length. Under the normal measure system， (0， 100) is regarded to contain 100 
times as many points as (0， 1). That in such ways as above-stated， points are 
distributed to sets， shall be illustrated as points occupy their positions in some 
repelling state each other. We abstract the notion of this repelling tendency to 
be associated with each individual point P and call it the resilience of P. Then 
μp may be thought as the measure of a sort of total resilience around P. 1n case 
of 2 dimensions， a point (x， y) is considered to have resiliences in positive and 
negative directions along :ト andy-axes. If ABC is a triangle and if any point of 
the side BC has two resilience民 oneparallel to BA and one prallel to CA， then 
the total linear measure of the resiliences on BC may be counted as AB + AC. 
Thus， the well幽knownparadoxical assertion that the length of BC must be equal 
to AB→ACラ mayactually be turned to be reasonable. 
3. Probabilism 
In the classical theory of sets， if‘a set A' is merely supposed to be existent， 
without any practical confirmation such as is seen in cases of a rectangle， sphere 
etc.， itmay not give any real fact and may not be other than a nonsensical 
designation， even when it is provided with the condition inA = 1. This is because 
the general notion of a set is not positively construed with measure theoretical 
foundations. 
(150) 
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Now， by the following tョble，let us compare the definition of the normal 
a priori measure with that of the notion of a descriptive set* of points : 
(M1) Any point P of the space E 
maintains the same size of occupation 
(P) and 伝(P)= μ; 
(M2) The total occupation of the 
points of A makes up 伝A satisfying 
the formula 
五>iA = n(A)f1. 
(81) Each point of E has its own 
position and can be distinguished from 
other points; 
(82) That A is an aggregate of 
points in E is confirmable by m回目
of the criterion 
(VPEE) (PEAVPilA). 
The total occupation of a set A may naturally be compared to the state that A is 
臼ledwith some substance. In effect， the space E， in physics， isusually consid“ 
ered to be everywhere五lledwith ‘ether'. Then μshall mean the mass-value of 
the ether equally assigned to each point and m A the total mass of the ether 
distributed to A. 
As to (S山thata point is distinguished from other points， shall， in the physi-
cal sense， mean that P is distinguished in the relation to the circumstance that an 
aggregate of points directly causes the total sum of the ether to be distributed to 
it. Such a physical distinction may not evidently be attained but for the notion 
of 'density' of the ether of A in any neighborhood of the point P. Besides， the 
density of the ether of A may directly be interpreted as the probability of occur-
rence of the points of A in a neighborhood of P. Thus， we may expound it: that 
a set A is determined as an aggregate of points in E， must coincide with the fact 
that， in any sphere S we have 
五>iAnSji五S= Pr(PEA) (3. 1) 
P being an aleatory variable point restricted within S. We adopt (3. 1) as the 
probabilistic definition of mA in relation to 1iS. 1iS is of a trivial measurability. 
When AcS，ゑA=Pr(PεA)後S.
On the above-stated foundation， itis remarkably important that any (descrip幽
tive) set must be 伝・measurable. This is apparently the effect of the physical 
interpretation of the space E by means of 'ether'. If we could pour the ether 
distributed to a set A into a vessel and weigh it， the mass-value 1iA might surely 
be obtained. With respect to (3. 1) we see that， probabilismラ inthis case， plays 
a role to turn the microscopic sight of a point occupation toward the macroscopic 
one of the total occupation of a set. As for the inversion number， the following 
formula holds: 
Pr(PEA(PEM & ACM))ニロ(A)jn(M)
on condition that n is the inversion number provided for a normal m四 sure.
If m， is a normal a priori measure， and if we have 
* An aggregate of points satisfying the conditions of (S2) is a descrかt叩 eset. 
(1日1)
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(VACE) (伝A=mlA)
we call 須1an a priori measure too， even when ml (P) is not everywhere equal. 
If 
私((P))手伝1((Q)) ， 
it simply means that the size of ((P)) is not equal to that of (Q). Therefore， 
that 勿 isnormal means that al of ((P)) are taken to be of equal size. If 
伝1((P))/九((Q))>l，
the probability of occurrence of the point P is naturally larger than that of the 
point Q. Since the construction of E i. r. t.* ml thus differs from that i. r. t. 
a normal measure m， the inversion number of a set i. r. t. ml must also differ 
from that i. r. t.弘 Denotingthe inversion number of a set A i. r. t.伝1by n(A， 
a山wehave 
戸1/f-l = n (A， i，)/口(A，ml)， 
where 1il isthe mean 銃1・dimension(i. e. the mean of ml (P) for P) in A and μ 
is the normal m-dimension. 
4. Complete Additivity 
If the family of sets (M，J (/ε1)， 1 being a set of ordinal numbers， satis五esthe 
condition 
and if 
(VcEI) (M，cK) 
O~ ゑK< ∞，
then (M，) is said to be m-bounded. In this section， we suppose that (lvf，l is i花園
bounded and monotone increasing viz. 
and 
(Vc， KEI) (cくκ二':;>M，CMJ，
M=UM，・ (4. 1) 
(4. 1) naturally suggests that M is the limiting set of (M，ふ Besides，since M is， 
in our view， considered伝-measurablewithout exception， itshall be defined that 
M is the limiting set of a ni-bounded monotone increasing family of sets (M，) 
when and only when 
円(M-M，)= void & inf iiiCM-M，J = O. 
Since the set of values i五;M，(cEI)isヲ bysupposition， a bounded set of real num-
bers， there exists a sequence (M，) (ん=1，丸一)such that 
lim 伝M'k= C = sup i，M，. 
Then， in empiricism， itis easily verified that 
c= mM. 
Thus i元isfound to be a completely additive set function. 
*‘i. r目t.'and ‘w. r. t.' are rendered 'in r巴spectto' and ‘with respect to' respectively. 
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In empiricism， a limiting object is admitted when and only when it can be 
approached by an enumerable process of stepping. So， in the case above同men-
tioned， itmust be that 
(立叫ん=1，2，…))(UM'k=M). 
Stil， itis notable that there is an additive set function in E， which is not 
completely additive， even when al points are given equal assignment by it. Such 
a function is called an ultra set Junction1). 
5. Application 
In order to construct an a priori measure we assumed spatial point occupa-
tions ((P))， which precisely fil up the whole space E without overlapping. By 
this way of construction， ifthe system of (P) (PEE) is given， the corresponding 
a priori measure m iscompletely determined and vice versa. In this regard， (P) 
is called the 伝-occupationof the point P. Now， let us assume that a mass quantity 
I p is univoquly assigned to each iふoccupation(P) to ιlefine a set function r (M) 
in the form 
rM(=r(M))ニ(0I p， 
PEM 
(5. 1) 
which means that the quantities I p are summed up through the total occupation 
of a set M. r iscalled an application and 後 isthen called the carrier of r in 
the meaning that the spatial construction for the integral (5. 1) is given by the 
system of 綴-occupations(P). Then， itis naturally assumed that 
Ip =子((P)).
I p is called the point a~ρication of P w. r. t. r. When I p is in五nitesimal，we write 
Ip=@; 
when non-negative and infinitesimal 
。 ~/p~@.。indicates‘empty null' which means the vacancy of quantity. In this section， 
we con五neour argument to the case of non-negative and bounded r. Then， it
may easily be seen that values of I p must be at most infinitesimal except at most 
an enumerable number of them. A general application may be expressed as 
a difference of two non-negative ones. 
If we could pour al of I p distributed to A together into a vessel and weigh 
them， the value r A might surely be obtained. If constructively， partitions of a set 
A may be brought forward to be observed along withぺ However，in empiricism， 
an observable partition must be limited to an enumerable one. Thus， we are 
forced to have the definition as follows: 
Definition. lJ， Jorαny en仰 zerableμrtition(Mk) (ん=1，2，…)oJ a set M， 
we have 
rM = I: rMk， 
(153) 
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then rM is r，φresented in the form 
rM = t0r p 
with rp =デ(P)， 
((P)) being poi九toccupα~tioπs i. r. t.αcertain a priori measure. 
In五ne，r isdefined by (5. 1) as a completely additive set function. This 
may be thought as a merit of empiricism. As for the quantitative criticism on 
r p， we may sort out the following four cases: (i) r p= (Q); (i) 0くら<∞;(ii) 
o <f(P)= rp/μp<∞; (iv) (Q)くら<@& f(P)=OV∞， μp being the point dimen-
sion of the carrier 弘 Thecomplement of the set {P: r p= (Q)} is the support of 
r. In the part of (ii)， r may be expressed as an integral 
t0f(P)μp or Jf(P)dP 
We assume the case (iv) to be possible， but do not make any detailed explanation 
on it here2). 
An additive set function f(in E) which is neither an a priori measure nor 
an application， isan ultra set function. In this case， the only formula generally 
promised for f isthat 
(VA， BCE) (f(AUB) =f(A)十f(B)-f(A円B)). 
I. Logic and Empiricism 
1. Ranging 
If a chain or a concatenation of symhols or words is certainly read as indi-
cating or designating some ohjects or some state of the ohjects， itis called a des目
cr;争tion(仇 thegeneralized sense). When exc1usive cases for certain situations 
are taken as elements， the set 
R(A) = {c: A is true in c} 
is called the usual deductive range of the descr匂tionA. Then， implication ‘二>'
may be defined by 
A二>B.三 .R(A) c R (B) (1. 1) 
on condition that R (A)手void. More generally， we assume that to any description 
A (of a given family of descriptions) uniquely corresponds a set R(A) (of elements 
of a given universe); then， by the implication de五nedby (1. 1)， we will obtain 
a deductive system of logical language. If U is a universe of objects and 
R(A)c U & R(A)手void，
then A is called a description (standing) on U. For a family of desriptions 'i?( it 
may not always be possible to find a universe U such that 
(154) 
Foundations of the Empiricist Theory of Sets and Set Functions and its Logic 499 
U R(A) c TJ. (1. 2) 
AE~l 
If TJ is existent and satisfIes (1. 2)， we say that A (ε~) or ~ is given a ranging 
in U， and then call U the range universe of this ranging. 
A course of logic usually involves a de五nitionof the level to correspond to 
a predicate or an object. If TJ is a range universe of which al elements are 
descriptions， then the elements of U shall be regarded as of the same level. If 
Th and [fz are range universes and if any element of uz is either a description 
on ur or a relation between subsets of Th， then [fz is said to be of h恕herlevel 
than Th， in that any element of uz is regarded as of higher level than any element 
of U，・IfU，。手 voidand there is no universe to be of lower level than Dムthe
level of uo is zero. However， itappears that essentially the levels of objects are 
determined relatively and not absolutely. For instance: when a line is de五nedby 
a pair of points， the line will be thought to be of higher level than the points ; 
but， when a point is de五nedby a pair of lines， the point will be of higher level. 
Such being the conditions， we will take the notion of the level only to be some明
times conveniently used in the relative meaning. Descriptions on the same uni-
verse U are of the same level， because their ranges then are equally subsets of U. 
If descriptions A and B are of the same level， following 8 cases are 
distinguished : 
α1: R(A) = void & R(B) = void; 
α3: R(A)学 void& R (B) = void ; 
α5: R(B)学 void& R(B) c R(A); 
α2: R (A) = void & R (B) =1 void ; 
α4: R(A)手void& R (A) c R (B) ; 
α6: R(A)学void& R (A) = R (B) ; 
α7: R(A) -R(B) =1 void & R(B)-R(A):;I= void & R(A)nR(B)学 void;
αs: R(A)手void& R(B)=Ivoid & R(A)nR(B) = void. 
Then， taking U = {αhα2， "'， αs} as the universe， we may have 
R(A二}B)= {αhαhα4，α6} . 
‘トA'is usually rendered 'A is true'. However， in this paper， we let ‘トA'n1ean 
'A is possible' (i. e. 'A is not impossible'). '，..，トA'is the negation of ‘トA'and 
is rendered‘A is impossible' or 'A is false'. 'A' itself cannot be rendered as 
a description on 広 whereasトAand，..，トA stand on U. 1n effect， we stiU have 
R(トA)= {αbα4，αbα白 α7，αs}， 1 
R(トB)= {α2，α4，α5，αhα7，αs}， i (1. 3) 
R(，. トA)= {αhα2} and R(，._ トB)= {αhα3}' ) 
1n五ne，(A二}B)八A is not a descr旬tionon U， but (A二}B)八(トA)and (A二}B)八
(r-vトA)are ones on U. 
Now， since 
R((A二}B)八(，..，トA))= R(A今B)円R(，. トA)= {αhαz} ， 
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with respect to (1. 3) we have 
R((A二';>B)八(r-.JトA)) R(トB)， R(~， トB)， but çR( トB)UR(~ トB).
Hence we conclude 
(A今B)八 (~f----A)カトB， 吟~トB， but二〉ト(BV~B). (1. 4) 
1t is remarkable that the result (1. 4) is incompatible with the assertion 'fallacy 
implies any event'， which is professed by some sect of symbolic logicians. 
2. Event Complex 
A description shall， in itself， be regarded as an event. If its usual range学
void， itis called aρossible event and if = void an irψossible one. Though the 
terms ‘event'，‘possible' and 'impossible' are， originallyラ ofthe theory of probability， 
they are rather more lucid than the corresponding terms of pure logic and may 
even be preferable in point of straightness for the empiricist view. With this 
terminology， we may straightly pass to the statistical view if needed. 
If the premises， notions or relations among them， and the available referential 
facts in the context of a theme are resolved into a finite number of descriptions 
d三 {A))"'， An} of which al are regarded as of the same level， then the stヨte
construction defined in the form 
c(A) = V~~l(AkV ，...._， Ak) 
is called the eventωmplex (or simply the complex) generated by A. 1n this 
case， partial products of 2n events Ak> ，._ Ak (ん=1，・・，n)， which do not vanish， 
make， in al， a五niteset 
r(A) = (rj)げ=1，…， lJ)， 
and rj are found to be mutually exclusive events. r(A) is called A-a学ectof the 
theme. 
If we take r(A) as the range universe， we may su伍cientlytransact inferences 
on the theme by means of the language standing on r (A)， i.e. the language 
which has r (A) as the universe of individuals. 
3. Inductive Range 
1nduction too is proceeded on contradistinction of some implicative relations. 
So then， a ranging must thereupon be contrived to de五nethe implication. Deduc-
tive ranges are found incompatible with this purpose. The deductive range of 
a description A comprises possible events of A as its elements， because， in a de・
ductive case， the point of observation is whether the object is possible (or true) 
or not. However， in an inductive case， observation rests only on the residual part 
of inspection， so the ranging should also be defined on this part. 
Assuming that 1{3 is a set of propositions and is provided with a criterion so
which is tested on subsets of事， if a subset P of 1{3 conforms to SO， we write 
vトP，and if not， ~so トP. In addition， we assume that sosatisfies the following 
two propertles: 
(156) 
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descr争tiveness: (V P ç~) (soトPV，._soトP):
regressi'L卵白s: pçQ ç_二弔&ヂトQ. 二~.so ト P. (3.1) 
In this case， we define a rang R (P) by the stipulation that 
and 
R(P) = ~-P when soトP
= void when ，.._，タトP.
(3. 2) 
Then， the implication appearing in (3. 1) may be realized by the de五nition:
P二~Q. 三 .R(P)ÇR(Q) (3. 3) 
on condition that R (P)手void. It will be needless to say that the left side of 
(3. 3) just means タトP二~so ト Q. The range defined by (3. 2) is called an inductive 
range. 
By means of the principle of cut approach3) in empiricism， we may directly 
attain the theorem: 
Proposition 3. 1. IJ ~ is a set ofρropositions with a descriptive and 
regressive criterionタtobe tested on its subsets，ωzd if 
~ヂト~
and (3PC~) (P学 voidand soトP)，
then there are two sequences of subseぉof~ (Pk) and (仏)(ん=1， 2， ..) such that: 
( i) P1 c P2 c .' c Q2 c Ql c I.s; 
(i) UPkニ nQk;
(ii) (vk) (soトPk& "'_'SOトQk)'
4. U nmaximizable Case 
If we apply the principle of trans五niteinduction， Proposition 3. 1 may be 
altered to the following result: 
[T]. Under the same conditions assumed in Proposition 3. 1， there exists 
a family of subsets of ~ (Pλ) (AεA)ωith仰仇dicationset A of ordinal numbers 
such thαt: 
( i) (VA， μεA) (えく μ. 二~.P， çpμ)キ;
(i) (VAEA) (cpトP;.);
(ii) QC ~ & Qコp=UP，.二>.，..soトQ. 
. P appearing in (ii) may be 民間rdedas a supremum w. r. t. so・ When such 
P exists， sois said to be maximizable on~. [T] itself， however， is denied in 
empiricism， by the following example. 
We may take a euclidian space (of五nitedimension) E as ~ in the sense that 
a point ア isalso regarded as a symbol‘P' rendered 'PεE'. so be de五nedby 
*守， shal henceforth be read as‘，then we havぜ Suchit may be read in either case of a de-
ductive or an inductive range. 
(157) 
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(/'ト A. 三.í元A~c ， (4. 1) 
c being a五xed五nitepositive number. If [T] in this case holds， there is a family 
of subsets of E 況ニ(A，)(えεA)such that 
え<μ.二;，.A，<;二Aμ
and if A ニ UA}.
we may have 
(VBCE) (BコA.今 .mB>c).
Since 仇 isan a priori measure in E， we then have 
伝λs叩(伝Jム)
so that i元λc.
Therefore， ifwe take an enumerable set N in E-A and define B as 
B= AUN 
we may directly have 
BコA&mE=c.
(4. 2) 
Thus (/' defined by (4. 1) cannot be maximizable. 1t is remarkable that the above-
shown contradiction (to the existence of A) is concluded only by the characteristic 
relation (4. 2) of an a priori meaureゑ andnot by any restriction on ordinal 
numbers. If we mean to insist [T]， we must then necessarily renounce the pro-
perty (4. 2) of伝 andthereafter assert either λto be denied its弘.measurabilty
or 伝 itselfto be denied its complete additivity. 
Since we shall be resting on the theory of a priori measure， we may not 
renounce (4. 2). Thus， we encounter an unexpected obstruction to the principle 
of trans-induction which was attempted to be an alternative renovation of the 
principle of transfinite induction. 1t is very regretful that here the preseut author 
must change his previous announcement that the principle of trans-induction may 
be made well四establishedby means of the empiricist principle of cut approach21 • 
Some refiection wiU show us that such an unmaximizable case as above discussed， 
may appear only when the residual part for inspection with respect to ~(/' dose 
not vanish out. So then， itis considered relevant to restrict the conditions as 
follows. 
If (/' is a regressive criterion on subsets of ~ and if 
(vPç~) (タトP&p'乎void.二;，(在。三宅)(PCQ&ヂトQ))'"， 
then (/' is said to be insuppressible on~. Then， itis easily shown that (/' is 
insuppressible whenever (/' is unmaximizable on~. We now assume an operator 
φcalled a (/'-inやectorbeing defined as follows: 
(i) pcφ(P) ; (i) PcQ.二;， .φ(P)三φ(Q);
'" pc三~-p and φ (P)σ=~φ (p). 
(158) 
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(iii)φ(P)*φ(Q).二';>.P手。;
(iv) soトP & pcQ & φ(QY*void. 二';>.(ヨRÇ~) (PcR & ヂトR
&φ(り)豆町R)).
In this case， the set P which holds タトP will be enlarged unless φ(P) vanishes. 
So we may have: 
Proposition 4. 1. Under the same designations with [T]， ifsoαccompanies 
a so・zn学ectorφ，叩emay have 
only when 
soトP
φ(P) =~. 
Besides， the principle of trans-induction shall be introduced in the renovated 
form as follows: 
Principle of Trans-induction. 1f sois a descr合IJtiveand regressive criterion 
on ~ and is provided withαso-inゆectorφ，then there is a monotone incr・easing
sequence of subsets of事 (Pk)(ん=1，2，…)such that 
Cvk) (soトPk)
αnd ηφ(Pk)σ= void. 
This principle shall， of course， rest on the ground of empiricism， i.e. on the 
view that any limiting process can be realized byan enumerable stepping whenever 
it is found possible. As for the limiting set P of the sequence， whether soトP
or ....，ヂト'tcannot generally be presented in advance. 
Mathematical Seminar in the Mωοran Inst. Tech.， Hokkaido 
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